

UNDERSTANDING THE NATURE AND ROLES OF NGOS

NGOs refer to organizations that are not based in government. These are diverse, private, self-governing, not-for-profit organizations dedicated to alleviate and reduce human sufferings by promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, and human rights and encouraging the establishment of democratic civil societies. They are committed to the services and protection of the sectors of society that are not served or underserved by governments, and those who are disadvantaged and victims of degradation.⁵ The work of NGOs internationally is grouped into four major categories: humanitarian assistance, human rights, civil-society and democracy building, and conflict resolution. Based on these functional categories, NGOs are classified as "humanitarian NGOs (a category that encompasses relief and development organizations), human rights NGOs, civil-society and democracy-building NGOs, and conflict resolution NGOs."⁶ The legitimacy of NGOs to operate is based on international humanitarian laws which were initially established with the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, the Geneva Conventions of 1949, and through the Nuremberg Principles of the United Nations General Assembly in the early 1950s.⁷

The first NGOs were founded in the 1800s, including the Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), and the American Red Cross. These NGOs continue to play a significant role in humanitarian assistance operations. The two world wars in the 20th century also led to the creation of large international agencies, such as Save the Children, the Catholic Relief Services, and the Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere (CARE). In the 1900s, the need for humanitarian assistance sharply increased because of the significant rise in the numbers of refugees and displaced persons such as those in Rwanda.⁸

The number of NGOs proliferated at the end of the Cold War. As United Nations humanitarian assistance operations took on a new significance, NGOs emerged as a vital part of international intervention. NGOs became highly visible participants with significant influence in the world scene and were essential players in the international response to humanitarian emergencies, human rights abuse, and nation-building and reconstruction. The Union of International Association reported in the 1998-1999 edition of its "Yearbook of International Organizations" that there were 16,586 NGOs, with 50% existing in the Western countries working in developing countries and supporting indigenous organizations. According to another estimate, about 25,000 now qualify as international NGOs. Amnesty International, for example, has affiliates or networks in over 90 countries and territories. Thousands of NGOs have also emerged in diverse countries as France, Bangladesh, the Philippines, Chile and others.⁹

Despite their dedication to the purpose of relieving human sufferings regardless of political, ethnic, religious, or other affiliation, NGOs, specifically those which deal with a volatile threat environment, face many challenges to neutrality, security, and coordination. Neutrality and impartiality are crucial to promote discourse and establish common ground for mutual understanding between opposing sides in conflict. NGOs are regarded as impartial if they deliver food and medicine to all sides in a conflict or if they focus their efforts on providing assistance to innocent populations such as children. However, in post-Cold War civil conflicts, civilian populations have been targeted in some situations, which made it more difficult to maintain an appearance of neutrality. In the “fog of war,” it is sometimes difficult to understand who the players are in the conflict. NGOs may run the risk of being regarded as supportive and sympathetic to an ethnic group to which opposing ethnic groups may interpret as biased and provocative, or may also run the risk of being seen as favoring the enemy by both sides of the conflict.¹⁰ Neutrality requires establishing trust and cooperation with both parties in conflict to gain access to the victims.¹¹

Security is another concern for NGOs, especially those engaged in relief, refugee, and human rights work in areas of conflict. NGOs are vulnerable and at times experience real dangers. This problem is compounded by the lack of security provided and the lack of security training of NGO workers. In the summer of 1996, at least 11 workers of the Red Cross were killed in Africa; in December 1996, six medical staff members of the ICRC were killed in their hospital in Chechnya; and in January 2000, eight aid workers were killed in southern Sudan. Because of security vulnerability, international NGOs have undertaken measures to ensure staff safety. An example is the training module developed by InterAction, an American NGO, which emphasized “personal-conflict handling techniques” to improve their sensibility to defuse or avoid confrontations rather than deterrence and personal protection.¹²

NGOs are also faced with the challenge of coordination not only within the civilian community, but also with military forces involved in the conflict or humanitarian and peace operations. During the humanitarian and peace operations in Somalia and Kosovo, NGOs were criticized for the lack of coordinated response, refusal to share resources, and unwillingness to collaborate with all intervening agencies. However, because of the current complexity and multi-layered nature of international operations and lessons learned from experience, independent action by NGOs has changed. They work collaboratively with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), other government funding agencies such as the U.S Agency for International Development (USAID), and other private voluntary organizations.¹³

RELIEF AND DEVELOPMENT OPERATIONS

The largest and best known humanitarian NGOs are likely to be engaged in relief and development operations worldwide. Relief operations include delivery of food, clean water, and sanitation equipment to distressed populations; provision of shelter to the homeless and displaced victims and refugees, repair of salvageable structures; and disease prevention, containment and treatment measures. Development operations focus on the long term improvement of vital components of society including agriculture, education, infrastructure, and employment.¹⁴

Relief and development operations require extensive cooperation among different agencies including the UN, the U.S military, and other private agencies. An example is the Rwanda refugee crisis on the borders of Goma, Zaire in 1994. Humanitarian NGOs and the UN responded immediately by establishing several camps which involved construction of shelters, sanitation and water systems, emergency medical centers, funeral services, warehouses for supplies, transportation systems, and communication systems. As the magnitude of the crisis became evident, the U.S. military was mobilized to augment and support the humanitarian efforts.¹⁵

HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY

Since the 1990s, human rights NGOs have given tremendous effort and attention to the formulation of mandates for promoting human rights. In 1997, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan recognized and accepted the NGO argument about the importance of human rights as “cross cutting issue and vital component of all aspects of the UN’s work” including humanitarian and peace keeping efforts. Most significantly, resources were made available for human rights activities and policies were formulated.¹⁶ One of the most significant endorsements of the Brahimi Report was Kofi Annan’s statement that:

I fully agree with the Panel’s conclusion on the centrality of human rights to United Nations peace activities and on the need to integrate human rights more effectively into prevention, peacekeeping, and peace-building strategies. To this end, it is necessary to strengthen the Organization’s capacity to plan, conceptualize and deploy human rights elements of peace operations.¹⁷

This ultimately reaffirmed the goal sought by human rights NGOs, such as the Amnesty International and Human Right Watch. Humanitarian and peace operations created by UN programs now have human rights components, including mandates for monitoring and reporting of human rights developments, assisting in human rights capacity building, coordinating technical assistance projects, and protecting the area of operations.¹⁸

DIPLOMACY AND COALITION BUILDING

Although NGOs have long operated internationally, their diplomatic role was rather limited until after World War II. To win a right to a voice and representation at the UN, NGOs lobbied heavily during the wartime negotiations in 1943-45. Their rights were eventually affirmed by the Article 71 of the UN Charter, as well as many subsequent decisions. By 2000, about 2,500 NGOs had consultative status with the UN and with other organizations and intergovernmental agencies. NGOs diplomatic effectiveness is most apparent when they work together in coalitions, pooling their resources and coordinating their lobbying efforts.¹⁹

In an active conflict, NGOs may be used as impartial intermediaries, working with the opposing parties, facilitating negotiations, and helping to uphold agreed upon resolutions. Their diplomatic role in negotiations may prevent escalation of conflict or crisis. Some NGOs with expertise in conflict management and resolution are involved in developing programs to improve skills in negotiation, strategy development, and identification and resolution of the underlying cause of conflicts.²⁰

GLOBALIZATION AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY

The evolving role of NGOs has generated research and debate in the context of globalization. NGOs no longer continue to execute their traditional roles as stand-alone entities, but are aggressively building constituencies for global and international cooperation, forming strategic alliances and partnerships to link local, national and global processes, and dividing roles and responsibilities in a collaborative way.²¹

Global networking and influencing strategies are essential for achieving significant impact in reducing sufferings from conflicts and promoting respect for human rights and democratic process. NGOs' emerging role in globalization include "influencing national governments to operate in ways that go beyond 'realist' foreign policy considerations, monitoring the effectiveness of regional powers in peacemaking and coordination, exploring strategies to enable national and global civil societies to move beyond charitable donations to mobilize governments to react early to emerging conflicts, and overseeing the private sector to monitor and sanction businesses that gain from war economies."²²

NGOs have a significant influence and role in international policy and decision-making. In recent years, NGOs have successfully promoted new environmental agreements, greatly strengthened women's rights, and improved the rights and well-being of children, the disabled, the poor, and the indigenous people.²³ In the East, South, and South East Asia, the Asia Development Bank (ADB), recognized that NGOs can play a critical role in the development and

sustainability of programs, including poverty-reduction programs, environmental programs and health promotion and disease prevention programs such as HIV/Aids prevention and education.²⁴

COALITION PARTNERSHIP

In view of their overarching goals and objectives, command and control structure, reliance on collaborative coordination and partnerships, and consensus style decision making, NGOs can play a major role as coalition partners. As coalition partners, NGOs are critical to the continuous process of assessing and reassessing relevant missions, developing interagency civil-military operation plans prior to undertaking crisis response and intervention. NGOs can provide and share information on current geo-political climate of the area of operation, cultural and religious considerations, activities of belligerent parties and public mood, status of services already provided and needed, assets and resources available, stated mission end-state and perspective on political end-state, expectations on military support, and disposition toward the military presence. This important information directly impacts on the military strategic commitment of resources and personnel to achieve humanitarian objectives.²⁵

Although humanitarian NGOs operate within their own charters and core values and the military follows directives as an instrument of national policy, cooperation and collaboration is critical in the success of humanitarian relief and development operations. NGOs bring humanitarian experience, familiarity of the area, and sustained commitment and they will remain and sustain operations when the military leave. NGOs, therefore, play a key role to the sustainability of humanitarian relief and development operations.²⁶

NGOs, such as the American Red Cross, have been active in training with the military for many years. As proponents for training and education, NGOs can significantly contribute and influence necessary training at all levels of military structure through exercises and conferences. Coordinated joint training affects interoperability and fosters better relationship and understanding of common and distinct roles and responsibilities of the military and NGOs.²⁷

The proven professionalism, capabilities, expertise, and resources in the conduct of humanitarian assistance operations by NGOs make it imperative that their presence and contributions are capitalized in the civil-military interface and interagency coordination process. Through mutual understanding of the roles and purpose, as well as through coordination and collaboration, the U.S. military can gain efficiency and economy of efforts from the NGOs and the NGOs can benefit from the logistical support, security and protection support, and information sharing from the military.

U.S MILITARY/NGO INTERFACE DOCTRINE

The complexity of future humanitarian assistance operations will require U.S. military force to effectively interface with NGOs as a unified international effort. *Operation Provide Comfort*, the 1991 operation to provide humanitarian relief to Kurds in northern Iraq, was the turning point for military-NGO interagency cooperation in pursuit of a common goal. Since then, there have been complex humanitarian emergency responses in Liberia, Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, Zaire, and Bosnia. The *Operation Uphold Democracy* in Haiti marked the first time the U.S. government organized to develop an interagency political-military plan of operation before initiating crisis response.²⁸ To address the lack of interagency authority, accountability, and staffing as well as the lack of standard operating procedures and doctrine to guide efforts on the increasingly intense post-Cold War humanitarian interventions, the Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 56, "*Managing Complex Contingency Operations*" was signed by President Clinton on May 20, 1997.²⁹ PDD 56 advocated reform in the joint/interagency coordination process to achieve unity of effort and improved planning and coordination among U.S. government agencies and organizations engaged in complex contingency operations (CCOs). It further recognized that the U.S. will continue to conduct CCOs, including peace operations and humanitarian assistance operations such as the implementation of the peace accord in Bosnia, the Operation Provide Comfort in Iraq, and the Operation Support Hope in Somalia.³⁰ PDD 56 also emphasized the use of the military in humanitarian intervention as a last resort, the preference for coalition operational effort, and the intent to maintain the capability to respond unilaterally.³¹ PDD 56 has proven successful in strategic level interagency planning and coordination such as in Haiti and meets the principal objective of enhancing the effectiveness of interagency coordination and management of CCOs. However, the directive fails to clearly define the civil-military relationship and the extent and limitations of military involvement in CCOs, which may prevent "mission creep."³²

The *Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations*, published in 2001, is one of the key documents which governs and provides doctrinal basis for military involvement in interagency operations with NGOs. Interagency coordination and planning is the vital link between the military and the NGOs to "mount a coherent and efficient collective operation and achieve unity of effort. Each organization brings its own culture, philosophy, goals, practices, and skills to the interagency table. This diversity is the strength of the interagency process, providing a cross-section of expertise, skills, and abilities."³³ The Joint Doctrine advocates several principles in civil-military interface with NGOs. Military personnel must understand and facilitate the principles of civilian operational and financial accountability and must recognize that emergency

relief operations conducted by NGOs are ten times much cheaper than the military. Military personnel could be tasked and called upon to provide military assistance to support CCOs and should be included early in the planning and coordination process. These legitimate military support tasks include protection of relief workers, lines of communications (LOCs), relief sites, and victims, provision of logistics support, particularly the transportation of NGO relief workers, assets and supplies, and provision of engineer and communication services such as maintaining and restoring relief LOCs, air traffic control, and airport management services. Due to the rapid influx of NGOs and the lack of accreditation and accountability standards which may result in excessive independent actions by NGOs, direct military contact with the lead and/or accountable organization or government is necessary.³⁴

INTERAGENCY PLANING AND COORDINATION

The civil-military operations interface and coordination was evident with the coordinated efforts between NGOs and the military in *Operation Provide Comfort*, *Operation Sea Angel*, *Operation Restore Hope*, *Operation Support Hope*, and *Operation Provide Relief*. The Civil-Military Operation Center (CMOC) was established and proved to be a successful venue for military support to NGOs.³⁵

The CMOC is the primary center for planning, coordination, and communication interface between the U.S. military and NGOs involved in humanitarian relief operations. As stated by Undersecretary of State, Thomas R. Pickering during the Exercise Emerald Express 98:

Possibly the most practical mechanism for ensuring coherence and cooperation is the CMOC.....attached to a Joint Task Force, where operational contact in the field between military and humanitarian participants in complex emergencies can take place Commanders have used the CMOC to reach out to host-country nationals in a locality as well as to NGO and international organizations, to offer a forum for airing problems as well as a vehicle for shaping expectations realistically regarding what forces in the field can and cannot do. The flexible, situation-specific CMOC may well be the instrument of choice for broad international and other coordination in the field.³⁶

CMOCs are established by combatant commanders or subordinate commanders in accordance with the demands of the area of operations and requirements for interaction with allies and with local civilian population. The size and composition are theater and mission dependent without organizational structure. Each humanitarian relief operation is unique and CMOCs are tailored with flexibility to adjust operations based on the mission.³⁷ Commitment of selected military staff in the CMOC, who understands the political and strategic aspects of emergency operations and

who can foster a strong spirit of cooperation, alongside NGOs enables them to respond with shared vision and learn from each other.³⁸

The Joint Doctrine for Civil Military Operations describes the CMOC functions as providing nonmilitary agencies with a focal point for activities and matters that are civilian related, coordinating relief efforts with U.S. and/or multinational commands, United Nations, host nations, and other nonmilitary agencies, providing interface with the U.S. information Service, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Country Team, and assisting in the transfer of operational responsibility to nonmilitary agencies. The CMOC also facilitates and coordinates activities of the joint force, other on-scene agencies, and higher echelons in the military chain of command, receives, validates, coordinates, and monitors requests from humanitarian organizations for routine and emergency military support, coordinates response to requests for military support with Service components and requests to nonmilitary agencies for their support, and convenes ad hoc mission planning groups to address complex military missions that support nonmilitary requirements, such as convoy escort, and management and security of refugee camps and feeding centers and follow-on assignment groups.³⁹

CMOCs serve as the day-to-day military representation in the Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) and the On-site Operations Coordination Center (OSOCC) to provide coordination and communication linkages between military capabilities and the needs of relief agencies and provide a conduit for information flow to further consensus building.⁴⁰ CMOCs provide a structure for cooperation, collaboration, consensus, and coordination to obtain unity of effort.⁴¹

INTERAGENCY TRAINING

Training is an essential and key element of U.S. military/NGO interface. At the two-day symposium on best practices in conflict management in June 2001, there was an overwhelming consensus for building relationships and increasing effectiveness in humanitarian assistance operations through training. Since humanitarian assistance missions are often ad-hoc, training tends to focus on individual agency goals and coordination with other organizations is worked on the fly or as needed. The NGO community is often faced with difficult challenges with regard to formalized training. Training demands are minimal, as most NGOs are too busy and focused on the job that needs to be done at the most expeditious way and requires funds which increases organizational overhead expenditure. Training is described as experienced-based and lacks a systematic training structure on the management of complex emergencies. Training

tends to rely on personal skills and general knowledge of state demographics and interagency processes. There is a lack of a coordinating structure and centralized training facility wherein members of various organizations can come together and network to learn from each other and share a common training experience.⁴² Despite these challenges, NGOs make every effort to train and learn through seminars, cross-postings, workshops, and retreats. Learning takes place through the development of mission, goals and objectives, and strategic planning. Identified NGO training needs are directed at managing relationships with host nation governments, donors, the military, the media, and the public. Working side by side with the military has created different but sometimes difficult challenges for NGOs, where training is a critical requirement to increase NGOs effectiveness in accomplishing humanitarian mission objectives.⁴³

FM 100-23, Peace Operations, discusses the important aspects of training to prepare troops in humanitarian and peace operations – pre-deployment training, unit training, leadership development training, individual training, sustainment training, and post-deployment training. Pre-deployment training emphasizes intelligence, observation, and reporting skills. Unit training focuses on civil-military operations, NGO operations, intercultural communications, protecting human rights of people, protecting the humanitarian relief workers, etc. Individual training emphasizes personal characteristics of patience to help soldiers adjust their expectations to the conditions surrounding their mission, professionalism and credibility, impartiality to guard against controversial disparate treatment, and inquisitiveness to become familiar with the threat environment, cultures of the local population and coalition partners. Post-deployment training allows for refresher training to hone skills necessary to return to a deployable and ready status.⁴⁴

The military typically have better funding resources and training opportunities compared to NGOs. Scheduled joint Service training events are routine and in recent years have increasingly extended training opportunities to the NGO community for their participation in common training for humanitarian and peace operations. The Army's Joint Training Center at Ft. Polk, Georgia conducts an ongoing training exercise in MOOTW for the forces. The training program incorporates information about working with NGOs and includes members of the NGO community in the field exercises.⁴⁵ In collaboration with the American Red Cross and the University of Hawaii, Tripler Army Medical Center, representing U.S. Pacific Command entered into an agreement and conducts a course which addresses international disaster management and humanitarian assistance requiring civil-military operations.⁴⁶

In 2000, the importance of interagency training was clearly emphasized by the National Security Council's Contingency Planning Interagency Working Group and designated the National Defense University (NDU) as the Executive Agent for training and education and after action review for U.S. government response to CCOs. The Interagency Training, Education, and After Action Review (ITEA) program was then established, designed to support U.S. political-military planners and responders. An assessment and requirement survey was conducted by ThoughtLink, Inc., through a contractual agreement with NDU. Findings from the survey posited significant recommendation to establish the NDU as the clearinghouse for all relevant interagency training and education initiatives. NDU should compile and make available an inventory of all training and education opportunities. Survey results also recommended the creation of a consortium of learning institutions offering courses related to interagency coordination and crisis response to allow courses to be conducted outside of a traditional academic or government setting, improvement of existing training by linking the planning phase and the implementation phase, through participation of planners and responders in scenario-based exercises and leveraging lessons learned and after action reviews from previous crisis operations, provision of appropriate training opportunities for senior-level personnel and enhancement of their participation by ensuring focus of training at the strategic level, and implementation of a management process to capture and archive knowledge and information from personnel when they rotate out of area of operation, through documentation of stories and experiences and collecting written formal or informal background and anecdotal papers. Also noted was the importance of restraining attitudes that minimize the value of training and education and instead promote linkages with career advancement. An example is the participation in the Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) as a pre-requisite for Joint Staff job opportunities and the participation in the ITEA as a pre-requisite to serving on a Policy Coordinating Committee.⁴⁷

There is an ongoing effort for interagency training and education opportunities, but for some reason or another, participants cannot take advantage of current offerings. There is a tremendous need to continue with the effort to educate the interagency community and the military on the value of interagency coordination and cooperation facilitated by the benefits of interagency training.⁴⁸

RECOMMENDATIONS

Despite great strides in coordination efforts resulting from lessons learned, strategic joint planning needs to be enhanced between NGOs and the U.S. military. It is imperative that the

military promotes and fosters trust and respect to facilitate open communication and information flow. The military must acknowledge that the NGOs operational efforts are more important than the military support tasks. Additionally, it is important that foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) is provided to victims with impartiality by both military and NGOs. The intense civil-military communication and coordination is critical in all phases of planning, deployment, operations, and transition to avoid fragmented actions which may result in prolongation, and/or failure of overall mission accomplishment.⁴⁹ CMOCs must be established early on in the operations and must be recognized as the “operational center of effort” which the military should support, just as they support any other operations center in the theater. Military/NGO collaboration and coordination must occur prior to the intervention which will foster mutual trust for one another. The NGO community must be involved at the planning stage to have input into the political, and economic issues affecting interventions.⁵⁰

The established synergistic relationship with shared vision and common interests will enable the military to transition smoothly along the continuum of effort – from assisting the NGOs with military operational support and infrastructure to withdrawal once a relative stability in the area of operation is achieved.⁵¹ Chris Seiple, in his book, *The U.S. Military/NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Intervention*, states that “If for no other reason than self-interest, the CMOC must become the priority because it represents --- through close coordination with NGOs and the rest of the humanitarian community --- the military’s best chance to design and control its exit strategy.”⁵²

Based on the experience of the UN Institute for Training and Research Program of Correspondence Instructions (POCI), training programs recognize that humanitarian assistance operations require many different types of training to address the different job requirements and skill levels of relief workers. The face-to-face classroom approach is preferable when it is important that students have interaction with the teacher and with other students to learn the concepts and stimulate dialogue and develop new ideas or solutions. Distance training and learning is another approach which has worked well. It has the advantage of lower costs and more flexibility of pacing the training to meet individual student’s needs; preferable when there is an existing standardized curriculum and materials and when students are geographically dispersed. These approaches to training can be creatively and resourcefully integrated. The UN Institute for Training and Research POCI and Training and Evaluation Services (TES) have developed a comprehensive and cooperative training program – combining classroom training, distance learning, and individual student research – leading to a certificate of training in UN peace support operations.⁵³ Another approach to facilitate NGO training is creating and

strengthening the relationship with academic communities for higher learning as well as practitioner communities to foster development of relevant training curricula. Some universities are currently engaged in curriculum development, including Tufts University's Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, which offers a master's degree program and a course for professionals; Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, which offers executive programs in civil-military cooperation; and George Mason University, which offers a master's degree program in peace operations.⁵⁴

Relevant education and training of military personnel is critical to the conduct of MOOTW, including humanitarian assistance operations, and to enhance interagency interface. Because the primary responsibility of the military is to prepare for operations in a major theater of war, training outside the primary role has been unstructured and has grown largely from experience and derived from lessons learned from past operations. Limited training time and resources forced military training to focus on mission essential tasks that individuals and units must be able to perform in order to successfully accomplish mission on the battlefield. The military considers humanitarian and peace operations as ad hoc and peripheral to wartime mission. Nevertheless, well-trained and disciplined troops play a valuable role in these operations. Some skills and tasks that may require additional training include conducting negotiations or mediations, conducting operations to avoid and control civil disturbances, operating checkpoints, conducting area-presence operations, understanding rules of engagement, conducting risk assessments, conducting civil-military relations, familiarizing oneself with the region and its culture, and conducting multinational operations.⁵⁵

There is a need to put greater effort and spending on research and self evaluation, although there is often an inherent hostility and aversion within the NGOs toward self-evaluation. NGOs need to learn how to engage and influence policy makers at levels that control budgets, mandates, and timeliness and establish meaningful incentives to encourage NGO staff to maximize training opportunities, to learn, reflect, synthesize, and annotate their learning experiences.⁵⁶ While there is a lack of "learning culture" among NGOs, there is certainly no lack of interest and enthusiasm for training.

CONCLUSION

The proven professionalism, capabilities, expertise, and resources in the conduct of humanitarian assistance operations by NGOs makes it imperative that their presence and contributions are capitalized in the civil-military interface and interagency coordination process. Through mutual understanding of the roles and purpose, as well as through coordination and

collaboration, the U.S. military can gain efficiency and economy of efforts from the NGOs and the NGOs can benefit from the logistical support, security and protection support, and information sharing from the military. With joint planning, individual plans are developed and end-states are better articulated and understood; shortfalls in capabilities and resources are recognized and supported; and communications across organizations and the populous are improved.⁵⁷

Strategic joint training at all levels is necessary to foster understanding and educate NGOs and the U.S. military about each other and to allow for coordinated development and use of training and education programs and technology. "Soldiers in the field, however, are no less in need of education and training on the challenges of interagency coordination than those posted to the Pentagon. Unit leaders will need to be able to make reasoned and informed decision ... to be able to distinguish between organizations, recognize their limitations and advantages, develop mutually beneficial relationships where feasible, and assure that all efforts – military and civilian – are as complimentary as possible."⁵⁸

The same is true with NGOs and other agencies. Both policy makers and field-level staff "need to learn about the military's organization, priorities, protocols, and personnel so that they know to whom to direct questions and requests, where decisions will ultimately be made, what limitations and capabilities they can expect to encounter in the field, and how best to ensure effective communication and coordination."⁵⁹

NGOs should be viewed as "force multipliers" for the U.S. military. NGOs have the knowledge and expertise to be critical coalition partners in the interagency process at the strategic policy-level, operational level, and field-level planning and decision making. The military experience, expertise, and capabilities in conjunction with the capabilities of NGOs will form an effective instrument of national power and achieve unity of effort to develop a comprehensive strategic joint doctrine to support international policies and the U.S. National Strategy for humanitarian assistance. The integrated and coordinated joint doctrine for early planning, communications, and training is of great importance to make optimum use of skills and resources provided by the U.S. military forces and NGOs in achieving the overarching national objectives to promote respect for human dignity and "to make the world not just safer but better." Successful military interface and interagency cooperation entails a better mutual understanding between the military and NGOs about their roles and more cohesive and collaborative operations in U.S. humanitarian and "nation-assistance" efforts worldwide.

WORD COUNT= 5566

ENDNOTES

¹Jennifer Morrison Taw, *Interagency Coordination in Military Operations Other Than War* (Washington, D.C.: Rand, 1997) 1.

²The National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2002) 1.

³Taw, 1-5.

⁴U.S. Department of Defense, *Interagency Coordination during Joint Operations*, Vol. II, (Washington, D.C.: Joint Publication 3-08, 1996)

⁵Lisa Witzig Davidson, Margaret Daley Hayes, and James J Landon, *Humanitarian and Peace Operations: NGOs and the Military in the Interagency Process*, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1996) 9.

⁶Pamela Aall, LtCol Daniel Miltenberger, and Thomas G. Weiss, *Guide to IGOs, NGOs, and the Military in Peace and Relief Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003) 94.

⁷Henry F. Carey and Oliver P. Richmond, *Mitigating Conflict: The Role of NGOs*, (Frank Cass Publisher, 2003) 4.

⁸Aall et al., 90.

⁹*Ibid.*, 91.

¹⁰*Ibid.*, 106.

¹¹Carey et al., 61.

¹²Aall et al., 109.

¹³*Ibid.*, 113-117.

¹⁴*Ibid.*, 121-122.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, 123-124.

¹⁶Carey et al., 81.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, 85.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, 74.

¹⁹James Paul, "NGOs and Global Policy-Making," June 2000; Available from <http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/analysis/anal00.htm>; Internet. Accessed 20 September 2004. 1-5.

²⁰Aall et al., 167-180.

²¹Carey et al., 1-7.

²²David Lewis and Tina Wallace, *New Roles and Relevance: Development NGOs and the Challenge of Change*, (Krumarian Press, 2002) 1-14.

²³Paul, 1-6.

²⁴David Line, ed., "Aid, Action, and Accountability: Non-Government Organizations in Asia," August 2004, AsiaInt Special Reports; Available from <http://www.AsiaInt.com>; Internet. Accessed 20 September 2004. 1-12.

²⁵_____. *The CJTF and NGOs – One Team, One Mission? A description of the Military and NGO Relationship and its Effect on Operational and Mission Execution*, (Naval War College, Newport, R.I., 1998) 4-8.

²⁶Chris Seiple, *The U.S. Military/NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Interventions*, (Carlisle, P.A.: Peacekeeping Institute, Center for Strategic Leadership, 1998) 1.

²⁷Davidson et al., 24.

²⁸Ibid., 14.

²⁹William P. Hamblet and Jerry Kline, *Interagency Cooperation: PDD 56 and Complex Contingency Operations*, (Joint Force Quarterly, Spring 2000) 97.

³⁰Ibid., 92-93.

³¹Presidential Decision Directive 56. *PDD/NSC 56 Managing Complex Contingency Operations*, (White House White Paper, May 1997); Available from <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd56.html>; Internet. Accessed 20 September 2004.

³²Hamblet et al., 92-96.

³³U.S. Department of Defense, *Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations*, (Washington D.C.: Joint Publication 3-57 2001) IV-2 – IV-3.

³⁴Ibid., IV-6-IV-7.

³⁵Seiple, 6-7.

³⁶Joint Publication 3-57, IV-11.

³⁷Ibid., IV-10.

³⁸Susan G. Sweat, *The Role of Humanitarian Relief Organization in National Security Strategy*, Strategy Research Paper (Carlisle Barracks, U.S. Army War College, 10 April 2001) 10.

³⁹Joint Publication 3-57, IV-14.

⁴⁰Davidson et al., 16.

⁴¹Sweat, 11.

⁴²Robert M. Schoenhaus, *Training for Peace and Humanitarian Operations: Advancing Best Practices*, (Washington D.C.: Institute of Peace, Peaceworks No. 43, April 2000) 5-6.

⁴³Ibid., 34-37.

⁴⁴FM 100-23, *Peace Operations*, (Washington D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, December 1994) 86-89.

⁴⁵Joint Readiness Training Center, Ft. Polk, Georgia, Available from <http://www.jrtc-polk.army.mil>: Internet. Accessed 26 November 2004.

⁴⁶Davidson, 18.

⁴⁷*Interagency Education and Training Survey Executive Summary*, Thoughtlink Inc., Available from <http://www.thoughtlink.com/publication/TLI00-IASurvey-ExecSum.htm>: Internet. Accessed 12 November 2004. 3-5.

⁴⁸Ibid., 5.

⁴⁹Joint Pub 3-57, IV-6 – IV-7.

⁵⁰Leslie A. Benton and Glenn T. Ware, *Haiti: A Case Study of the International Response and the Efficacy of Non-Governmental Organizations in the Crisis*, Available from <http://www.law.emory.edu/EKR/volumes/spg98/benton.html>: Internet. Accessed 12 November 2004. 28.

⁵¹Sweat, 11.

⁵²Seiple, 136.

⁵³The United Nations Institute for Training and Research Programme of Correspondence Instruction in Peacekeeping Operations. Available from <http://www.unitarpoci.org/en/cotipso.html>. Internet. Accessed 26 November 2004.

⁵⁴Schoenhaus, 16.

⁵⁵Ibid., 34-37.

⁵⁶Ibid., 36-37.

⁵⁷Davidson, 35-37.

⁵⁸Taw, 30.

⁵⁹Ibid., 30-31.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Aall, Pamela, LtCol. Daniel Miltenberger, and Thomas G. Weiss. *Guide to IGOs, NGOs, and the Military in Peace and Relief Operation*. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000.
- Benton, Leslie A. and Glenn T. Ware. *Haiti: A Case Study of the International Response and the Efficacy of Non-Governmental Organizations in the Crisis*. Available from <http://www.law.emory.edu/EKR/volumes/spg98/benton.html>. Internet. Accessed 12 November 2004.
- Carey, Henry F. and Oliver P. Richmond. *Mitigating Conflict: The Role of NGOs*. Frank Cass Publisher, 2003.
- Center for Disaster and Humanitarian Assistance Medicine. *Measuring the Effectiveness of Department of Defense Humanitarian Assistance*. CDHAM Publication 02-03, #MDA 905-99-M-0726
- Clinton, William S. *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*. Washington, D.C.: The White House, December 1999.
- Currey, Craig J. *A New Model for Military/Nongovernmental Organization Relations in Post-Conflict Operations*. Strategy Research Paper. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 7 April 2003.
- Davidson, Lisa Witzig, Margaret Daly Hayes, and James J. Landon. *Humanitarian and Peace Operations: NGOs and the Military in the Interagency Process*. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1996.
- FM 100-23, Peace Operations. Washington D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 30 December 1994.
- Graham, James R. *Non-Combatant Roles for the U.S. Military in the Post-Cold War Era*. Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, Fort Lesley J. McNair, 1993.
- _____. *Greater Efficiency in Humanitarian Assistance Operations*. Task 1 and 2: Cuny Center, January 2002.
- Gibbings, Thomas, Donald Hurley and Scott Moore. *Interagency Operations Center: An Opportunity We Can't Ignore*. Parameters, Winter 1998. Available from <http://carlisle-www.army.mil/USAWC/Parameters/98>. Internet. Accessed 12 November 2004.
- Hamblet, William P. and Jerry Kline. *Interagency Cooperation: PDD 56 and Complex Contingency Operations*. Joint Force Quarterly, Spring 2000.
- _____. *Interagency Education and Training Survey Executive Summary*. ThoughtLink Inc.. Available from [Http://www.thoughtlink.com/publication/TLI00-IASurvey-ExecSum.htm](http://www.thoughtlink.com/publication/TLI00-IASurvey-ExecSum.htm). Internet. Accessed 12 November 2004.

- Joint Readiness Training Center, Ft. Polk, Georgia, Available from <http://www.jrtc-polk.army.mil>: Internet. Accessed 26 November 2004.
- Lewis, David and Tina Wallace. *New Roles and Relevance: Development NGOs and the Challenge of Change*. Krumarian Press, 2002.
- Line, David, ed. "Aid, Action, and Accountability: Non-Government Organizations in Asia," August 2004; Available from <http://www.AsiaInt.com>; Internet. Accessed 20 September 2004
- Mendel, William W. and David G. Bradford. *Interagency Cooperation: A regional Model for Overseas Operations*. McNair Paper 37, Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, March 1995.
- Macrae, Joanne. *The New Humanitarianism: A Review of Trends in Global Humanitarian Actions*. Humanitarian Policy Report 11, April, 2002.
- Mockaitis, Thomas R. *Bridging the Gap: Humanitarian Organizations and the Military Peace Operations*. Internet. Accessed 10 November 2004.
- Paul, James A., *NGOs and Global Policy-Making*, June 2000; Available from [Http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/analysis/anal00.htm](http://www.globalpolicy.org/ngos/analysis/anal00.htm)>. Internet. Accessed 20 September 2004.
- Presidential Decision Directive 56. *PDD/NSC 56 Managing Complex Contingency Operations*, White House White Paper, May 1997; Available from <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd56.htm>!; Internet. Accessed 20 September 2004.
- Schoenhaus, Robert M. *Training for Peace and Humanitarian Operations: Advancing Best Practices*. Washington D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, Peaceworks No. 43, April 2002.
- Segal, David R. and Dana P. Eyre. *U.S. Army in Peace Operations at the Dawning of the Twenty-First Century*. College Park, MD: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 1996.
- Seiple, Chris. *The U.S. Military/NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Interventions*. Carlisle, PA: Peacekeeping Institute, Center for Strategic Leadership, 1996.
- Sweat, Susan G. *The Role of Humanitarian Relief Organization in National Security Strategy*. Strategy Research Paper. Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 10 April 2001.
- Taw Jennifer Morrison. *Interagency Coordination in Military Operations Other Than War*. Washington, D.C.: Rand, 1997.
- _____. SCHR Position Paper on Humanitarian-Military Relations in the Provision of Humanitarian Assistance. Internet. Accessed 12 November 2004.
- _____. *The CJTF and NGOs – One Team, One Mission? A Description of the Military and NGO Relationship and its Effect on Operational and Mission Execution*. Naval War College, Newport, RI. 1998.

The National Security Strategy of the United States of America. Washinton, D.C.: The White House, September, 2002.

The United Nations Institute for Training and Research Programme of Correspondence Instruction in Peacekeeping Operations. Available from <http://www.unitarpoci.org/en/cotipso.html>. Internet. Accessed 26 November 2004.

U.S. Department of Defense. *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War*. Joint Publication 3-07. Washington, D.C.: 1995.

U.S. Department of Defense. *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Vol. 1*. Joint Publication 3-08. Washington, D.C.: 1996.

U.S. Department of Defense. *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations, Vol. 11*. Joint Publication 3-08. Washington, D.C.: 1996.

U.S. Department of Defense. *Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations*, Joint Publication 3-57. Washington D.C.: 2001.

